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1  Introduction
Sincere (or loyal) co-operation between the Member States of the European Union 
and the EU institutions is a key constitutional principle of EU law (Klamert 2014). 
It is of particular significance for the EU’s external relations taking into account the 
complex mix of exclusive, shared, parallel, and sui generis competences in this 
particular area. Proceeding from the case law of the European Court of Justice 
regarding mixed agreements—quite confusingly with reference to various denomi-
nations, such as “the duty of genuine cooperation”,1 “the obligation to cooperate in 
good faith”,2 and “the principle of the duty to cooperate in good faith”3—the duty of 
co-operation gradually developed into a key mechanism determining the EU’s 
external representation and—mutatis mutandis—the scope for individual Member 
State action in foreign policy (Hillion 2009; Neframi 2010; Casolari 2012).
The duty of sincere cooperation, as laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, involves both 
positive and negative Member State obligations. The positive obligation requires 
1 Judgment of 14 July 2005, Commission v Germany, C-433/03, EU:C:2005:462, paragraph 64.
2 Judgment of 20 April 2010, Commission v Sweden, C-246/07, EU:C:2010:203, paragraph 77.
3 Judgment of 27 February 2007, Segi and Others v Council, C-355/04, EU:C:2007:116, paragraph 
52.
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Member States “to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of 
the institutions of the Union.” In the sphere of EU external relations, this basically 
implies a duty to act as “trustees of the Union interest” (Cremona 2011; Schütze 
2014). This is particularly relevant in those areas where the Union is internationally 
disabled from exercising its competences; for instance, when international organisa-
tions only recognise States as participating members. With regard to the EU’s rep-
resentation in the International Labour Organisation (ILO), for instance, the Court 
of Justice unequivocally stated that the EU’s inability to conclude an ILO Convention 
implies that it must act “through the medium of the Member States”.4 Hence, the 
positive side of the duty of co-operation requires the Member States to operate as 
the mouthpiece of the Union in the international arena. The negative side of the 
same duty requires the Member States to refrain from actions that “call in question 
the EU’s capacity for independent action in its external relations”.5 This is often 
perceived as a “duty to remain silent” implying that the Member States are restricted 
in expressing their own position when this could jeopardise the unity of the EU’s 
representation (Delgado Casteleiro and Larik 2011).
Of course, the loyalty obligation is not unlimited in the sense that it cannot affect 
other constitutional principles, such as conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality 
(Article 5 TEU).6 Hence, the question arises how a balance between Union and 
Member State interests can be achieved in the field of external relations. As observed 
by Robert Schütze, a broad interpretation of the duty of co-operation “better pro-
tects the unity of external representation of the Union and its Member States [but] 
there is a danger for the autonomous exercise of the latter’s international powers” 
(Schütze 2014, p. 339). There is, in other words, a concern that the duty of sincere 
cooperation may become a vehicle for competence creep meaning that the scope for 
autonomous Member State action is severely restricted in practice notwithstanding 
a formal retention of powers (Reuter 2013).
The present contribution aims to clarify the concrete procedural and substantive 
implications of the duty of sincere co-operation in order to identify the room of 
manoeuvre for individual Member States at the international stage. After a brief 
analysis of the Treaty framework, the question is addressed whether the duty of 
sincere co-operation involves a duty of result or rather a duty of conduct for the 
Member States. It will be argued that the answer to this question essentially depends 
upon the particular context of the EU’s involvement and, more specifically, upon the 
implications of a Member State’s intervention for the unity of the EU’s representa-
tion and the uniform application of EU law. Finally, the contribution discusses the 
procedural options for the protection of Member State interests against a potentially 
expansionist EU action at the international level.
4 Opinion of 19 March 1993, ILO Convention, 2/91, EU:C:1993:106, paragraph 37.
5 AG Mengozzi Opinion of 29 January 2015, Commission v Council, C-28/12, EU:C:2015:43, 
paragraph 63.
6 Judgment of 1 October 2009, Commission v Council (CITES), C-370/07, EU:C:2009:590.
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2  The Duty of Sincere Co-operation: Constitutional 
Foundations
The duty of sincere cooperation is generally regarded as “a subcategory” or “an 
expression” of a more general principle of loyalty (Klamert 2014, p. 33; Neframi 
2010, p. 324). It can be linked to both the public international law principle of pacta 
sunt servanda and the concept of federal loyalty (or Bundestrue) known in the 
German constitutional system (Klamert 2014, p. 19). The latter presupposes that all 
actors in a federal system are mutually loyal to each other in order to achieve the 
goals of the federation despite its inherent complexity. As such, loyalty operates as 
a structural principle pursuing cooperation, compliance and complementarity.
It is noteworthy that a provision on loyalty was already included in the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and that, ever since, 
loyal or sincere cooperation has become a centrepiece of the European legal integra-
tion process (Constantinescu 1987). The wording of the relevant provisions barely 
changed over the years even though the context and implications of the loyalty 
obligation gradually developed with the expanding case law of the Court of Justice 
and the revision of the Treaties (Klamert 2014, pp. 9–11).
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, a general duty of sincere co-operation can be found 
in Article 4 (3) TEU:
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in 
full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union.
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.
Compared to pre-Lisbon Article 10 TEC, this provision has been significantly 
strengthened in a number of ways. First, it has acquired a central position at the 
inception of the Treaty on European Union, immediately after the articles on the 
EU’s values and objectives. It is, therefore, a key constitutional principle of general 
application in the EU legal order.7 Second, whereas a literal reading of former 
Article 10 TEC appeared to suggest a one-way duty incumbent on the Member 
States (an interpretation rejected by the EU Court of Justice),8 the principle is now 
explicitly reciprocal. This more balanced approach is further reinforced with a ref-
erence to the principle of conferred powers and the respect for national identities in 
7 Significantly, in the pre-Lisbon context, the principle of genuine cooperation was only explicitly 
mentioned in Article 10 of the EC Treaty and thus, in theory, restricted to the former first pillar of 
the Union. Nevertheless, the Court in Pupino suggested that Article 10 TEC had a trans-pillar 
application, Judgment of 16 June 2005, Pupino, C-105/03, EU:C:2005:386, paragraph 42. The 
Treaty of Lisbon logically confirms this approach taking into account the formal abolition of the 
pillar structure, without however abandoning the special treatment of the former second pillar 
(Common Foreign and Security Policy), expressed in Article 24(3) TEU.
8 Judgment of 17 December 1981, Luxembourg v Parliament, 30/81, EU:C:1983:32, paragraph 37.
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the first and second paragraph of Article 4 TEU. Moreover, Article 13 TEU states 
that the “institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation”. The similar word-
ing as in Article 4(3) TEU suggests the equal application of the principle of sincere 
cooperation to inter-institutional relations. This similarly codifies and clarifies the 
Court’s jurisprudence where it had already stated that “inter-institutional dialogue 
[…] is subject to the same mutual duties of sincere cooperation as those which gov-
ern relations between Member States and the Community institutions”.9 The post- 
Lisbon case law only confirmed the importance of the principle of sincere 
co-operation in an inter-institutional context. For instance, the Court derived from 
this principle an obligation for the Commission to consult the Council before it 
intends to express positions on behalf of the EU before an international court.10
Whereas the Court played—and still plays—a crucial rule in clarifying the pro-
cedural and substantive obligations flowing from the general duty of sincere coop-
eration, the implications of this principle with respect to the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) are less obvious. Despite the formal “depillarisation” 
undertaken by the Treaty of Lisbon and the explicit statement that the principle of 
sincere cooperation applies to the Union as a whole, a separate CFSP-specific duty 
of cooperation is maintained in Article 24(3) TEU:
The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s 
action in this area. The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their 
mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the inter-
ests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations. The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these 
principles.
This seems at first sight a redundant repetition, the more so since the provisions 
of this article to a large degree mirror those of Article 4(3) TEU (De Baere 2008, 
p. 262). Hence, the question arises to what extent the duties of abstention and coop-
eration resulting from the loyalty principle bind the Member States and EU institu-
tions in the field of CFSP differently in comparison to other areas of EU law. Several 
elements seem to indicate that, from a legal normative point of view, the importance 
of this distinction should not be overestimated.
First, the Union’s action on the international scene—including the CFSP—is 
guided by a single set of principles and objectives (Article 21 TEU) and is based on 
a single institutional framework (Article 13 TEU). Second, whereas “mutual (politi-
cal) solidarity” is not a traditional normative legal concept (Koutrakos 2008, p. 670; 
Czuczai 2017), Article 28(2) TEU specifies that CFSP decisions “commit the 
Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity”. 
Article 29 TEU further provides that “Member States shall ensure that their national 
policies conform to the Union positions.” As a corollary, it can thus be argued that 
also in the field of CFSP the sovereignty of the Member States has been limited 
9 Judgment of 27 September 1988, Greece v Council, 204/86, EU:C:1988:450, paragraph 16; 
Judgment of 30 March 1995, Parliament v Council, C-65/93, EU:C:1995:91, paragraph 23.
10 Judgment of 6 October 2015, Council v Commission, C-73/14, EU:C:2015:663, paragraph 86.
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(Lenaerts and Corthaut 2006, p. 289). This is confirmed in the Rosneft case where 
the Court of Justice recalled the Member States’ obligation to obey CFSP decisions, 
notwithstanding their non-legislative nature. In the Court’s view, the latter is a pro-
cedural matter which does not concern the binding force of the act.11 Third, the 
CFSP loyalty principle laid down in Article 24(3) TEU is drafted in a rather straight-
forward and mandatory manner. The Member States “shall support” the Union’s 
external and security policy, they “shall comply” with the Union’s action in this area 
and “shall refrain” from any action that is contrary to the Union’s interests or is 
likely to impair the effectiveness of its international action as a cohesive external 
actor. Moreover, the text leaves little scope for exceptions as suggested by the 
expressions “actively” and “unreservedly” (Hillion and Wessel 2008, p. 91). In his 
interpretation of former Article 11(2) TEU (current Article 24(3) TEU), Advocate 
General Mazák already concluded that there is “a strengthened obligation to act in 
good faith”, similar to that contained in (ex) Article 10 TEC.12 The abolition of the 
pillar structure and the strict formulation of the Member States’ obligations in the 
field of CFSP reinforces this conclusion. Moreover, the Court’s pre-Lisbon case law 
regarding the former third pillar suggested a holistic application of general Union 
principles. It is natural to transpose this approach to the post-Lisbon context. Last 
but not least, the Court’s expanding post-Lisbon case law confirms that the interpre-
tation and application of CFSP activities is subject to the constitutional norms of EU 
law. In H. v Council and Rosneft, for instance, the Court referred to respect for the 
rule of law as one of the EU’s founding values which are also fully applicable in 
relation to the CFSP (Van Elsuwege 2017).13
Taken to its logical conclusion, the unity of the EU legal order implies that the 
Union’s constitutional principles, including the requirements of consistency and 
sincere cooperation, equally apply throughout the Union with the Court of Justice 
as its ultimate arbiter (Hillion 2012, 2014). However, the question is how such inter-
pretation can be reconciled with the different formulation of loyal cooperation as far 
as action in the field of CFSP is concerned. Is Article 24(3) TEU only a relic of the 
past which cannot affect the horizontal application of the EU’s basic principles, or 
should the inclusion of a specific CFSP principle of loyalty, alongside the general 
principle of Article 4(3) TEU, be regarded as an indication that the Member States, 
as Masters of the Treaties, intend to be less constrained in their actions in this par-
ticular field? The addition of two declarations concerning the CFSP—underlining 
that the CFSP provisions of the TEU cannot affect the Member States’ powers in 
foreign affairs—as well as the existence of ‘specific rules and procedures’ in this 
11 Judgment of 28 March 2017, PJSC Rosneft Oil Company v Her Majesty’s Treasury et. al., 
C-72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 62.
12 AG Ján Mazák Opinion of 8 May 2008, Greece v Commission, C-203/07 P, EU:C:2008:270, 
paragraph 83.
13 Judgment of 19 July 2016, H. v Council, C-455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569, paragraph 41; Judgment 
of 28 March 2017, PJSC Rosneft Oil Company v Her Majesty’s Treasury et. al., C-72/15, 
EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 72.
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particular area seem to point in the latter direction.14 At least, it appears that the 
implications of the loyalty obligation cannot be the same. For instance, Member 
States cannot be prevented from acting at the international stage in relation to the 
CFSP even though they are subject to specific restraints, such as the obligation of 
consultation within the European Council or the Council, laid down in Article 32 
TEU, and the need to ensure that their national policies conform to the Union posi-
tions under Article 29 TEU.  Whereas these commitments are binding upon the 
Member States, enforceability remains an issue taking into account the limits to the 
Court of Justice’s jurisdiction in the field of CFSP. The horizontal application of the 
general loyalty obligation of Article 4 (3) TEU may be a potential solution in rela-
tion to infringements of the general provisions on EU external action but, as argued 
by Advocate General Wahl, “infringement proceedings under Articles 258 to 260 
TFEU seem to be altogether excluded for simple breaches of CFSP rules”.15
3  Implications for Member State Action: An Obligation 
of Result or an Obligation of Conduct?
The duty of loyal cooperation significantly affects the scope for Member State 
action at the international level. Already in the famous AETR judgment of 1971, the 
Court of Justice derived from ex Article 5 EEC Treaty (now Article 4(3) TEU) a 
prohibition for the Member States to exercise their external competences when this 
would risk to affect internal Union rules or alter their scope.16 Each time the Union 
institutions adopt common rules with a view to implement a common policy envis-
aged by the Treaties, the Member States no longer have a right to undertake obliga-
tions with third countries which affect those rules. Under such circumstances, only 
the Union is in a position to assume and carry out contractual obligations towards 
third countries. The only exception concerns the field of CFSP which falls outside 
the scope of application of the implied powers doctrine (Reuter 2013, p. 89).
In Commission v Greece, the Court clarified that the so-called AETR-effect not 
only applies with respect to the conclusion of international agreements, but also 
regarding the adoption of positions within international organisations (see Cremona 
2009, p. 754).17 The case concerned a Greek proposal made within the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) for monitoring compliance of ships and port facilities 
with the requirements of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS Convention) and International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS 
Code). Significantly, the EU is not a member of the IMO since by virtue of the IMO 
Convention membership is only open to States. Likewise, the Union cannot accede 
14 See Article 24 TEU and Declarations no. 13 and 14 to the TEU.
15 AG Wahl Opinion of 7 April 2016, H. v Council, C-455/14 P, EU:C:2016:212, paragraph 39.
16 Judgment of 31 March 1971, Commission v Council, 22/70, EU:C:1971:32, paragraph 22.
17 Judgment of 12 February 2009, Commission v Greece, C-45/07, EU:C:2009:81.
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to the conventions agreed within the framework of the IMO. This does not prevent 
that many of the issues dealt with by the IMO have in fact been incorporated in the 
EU legal order. For instance, Regulation 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facil-
ity security essentially implements the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code.18 
The regulation inter alia provides for regular consultations between the Member 
States and the Commission in order to define common positions to be adopted in the 
competent international fora.19 After the issue of compliance with the SOLAS 
Convention and the ISPS Code was not discussed in the relevant internal comitol-
ogy structures, notwithstanding a Greek request to do so, Greece decided to autono-
mously bring the matter to the IMO. According to the Commission, this was in 
breach of the Member States’ obligations under the duty of loyal cooperation.
The Court essentially followed the Commission’s reasoning that the Greek ini-
tiative was likely to affect the provisions of the regulation implementing the relevant 
IMO rules (Regulation 725/2004). In line with its findings in AETR, the Court sig-
nificantly curtailed the option for individual Member State action20:
The mere fact that the Community is not a member of an international organisation in no 
way authorises a Member State, acting individually in the context of its participation in an 
international organisation to assume obligations likely to affect Community rules promul-
gated for the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.
Whereas Member States can take part in international organisations of which the 
Union is not a member, they must observe their obligations under EU law. All posi-
tions adopted by the Member States within such organisations are to be the result of 
prior coordination within the Union.21 If no Union position on a matter of exclusive 
competence can be adopted, the Member States can simply not act at all. This is, 
with so many words, expressed in the voluntary procedural framework for the adop-
tion of positions within the IMO (Council of the European Union 2005). When the 
Council does not succeed in adopting a Union position, the Member States can only 
contribute to the debate with information or factual comments but without express-
ing a position of their own. This basic rule applies even when the Commission has 
failed to take the necessary measures for instituting the internal coordination pro-
cess. As observed by the Court of Justice in the IMO case, Member States are not 
entitled to unilaterally adopt corrective or protective measures to compensate a 
breach of the duty of cooperation on the part of the EU institutions.22
18 Regulation (EC) 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on 
enhancing ship and port facility security, [2004] OJ L/129/6.
19 Article 10(4) Regulation 725/2004.
20 Judgment of 12 February 2009, Commission v Greece, C-45/07, EU:C:2009:81, paragraph 30.
21 This rule was already expressed in Opinion 2/91, where the Court observed that in situations 
where the EU cannot accede to an international agreement but its Member States can, “cooperation 
between the Community and the Member States is all the more necessary” where the Union must 
act “through the medium of the Member States”, Opinion of 19 March 1993, ILO Convention, 
2/91, EU:C:1993:106, paragraph 36.
22 Judgment of 12 February 2009, Commission v Greece, C-45/07, EU:C:2009:81, paragraph 26.
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The procedural rules on participation in the IMO also reveal that the Member 
States have, in principle, more flexibility in areas of shared competence. Here as 
well, there is a duty of prior coordination but the option of individual Member State 
action is not excluded totally. If the Council does not succeed in adopting a common 
position of the Union and its Member States, the representatives of the Member 
States retain their freedom to express their position on the matter concerned, as long 
as this does not conflict with the Union acquis (Council of the European Union 
2005, p. 12). Hence, there appears to be a conceptual difference in the application 
of the duty of cooperation depending on the nature of the EU’s competence at stake. 
When the Union is exclusively competent, the Member States are under an obliga-
tion of result. They either follow an established Union position or do not act at all. 
With regard to shared competences, the duty of cooperation merely implies an obli-
gation of conduct. A Member State must try to find common ground within the 
Council, but if this is not successful it is entitled to act alone. Any other interpreta-
tion appears to disrespect the division of competences and the principle of conferred 
powers in the EU (Cremona 2008, p. 168). A similar reasoning applies with respect 
to the conclusion and ratification of mixed agreements where the Court has stressed 
on various occasions the requirement of close cooperation between the Member 
States and the EU institutions in light of the requirement of unity in the international 
representation of the Union.23 However, as argued by Van der Loo and Wessel, “this 
principle cannot be stretched so as to oblige Member States to ratify a mixed agree-
ment” (Van der Loo and Wessel 2017, p. 744). The Member States do in fact retain 
their competence, as sovereign State parties, to express their consent to be bound.24 
In other words, the Member States are under an obligation to initiate the national 
ratification process (i.e., an obligation of conduct) without anticipating upon the 
outcome of this process (i.e., no obligation of result) (Van der Loo and Wessel 2017, 
p. 745).
The Court’s decision in Commission v Sweden reveals that the borderline between 
what is expected from Member States under the duty of sincere cooperation, on the 
one hand, and the nature of the EU’s competence, on the other hand, is not always 
straightforward. In this case, Sweden failed to fulfil its obligations under the duty of 
sincere cooperation by unilaterally proposing an addition to the list of dangerous 
substances in Annex A to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(POPs). Under the Convention rules, any party may propose that a substance be 
23 See, inter alia, Opinion of 19 March 1993, ILO Convention, 2/91, EU:C:1993:106, paragraph 38; 
Opinion of 15 November 1994, WTO, 1/94, EU:C:1994:384, paragraph 108; Opinion of 6 
December 2001, Protocole de Cartagena sur la prévention des risques biotechnologiques, 2/00, 
EU:C:2001:664, paragraph 18; Judgment of 20 April 2010, Commission v Sweden, C-246/07, 
EU:C:2010:203, paragraph 73; Judgment of 28 April 2015, Commission v Council, C-28/12, 
EU:C:2015:282, paragraph 54.
24 See in this respect, AG Sharpston Opinion of 21 December 2016, Singapore FTA, 2/15, 
EU:C:2016:992, paragraph 77, where she observed that the Member States do not act “as a mere 
appendage of the European Union” in the ratification procedure of mixed agreements while also 
pointing out that the Member States would continue to be bound—as a matter of EU law—by the 
areas of the agreement falling under EU competence.
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considered a POP and added to its annexes. Since both the EU and the Member 
States are parties to the Stockholm Convention, they, in principle, all have the right 
to propose such an addition. However, the Court found that the independent Swedish 
proposal to add perfluoroctane sulfonate (PFOS) to the list went against a concerted 
common strategy within the Council, which was not to propose the listing of PFOS 
immediately, inter alia for economic reasons. Moreover, the decision-making pro-
cess provided for by the Stockholm Convention implied that the unilateral Swedish 
initiative had significant consequences for the Union. Pursuant to Article 25(2) of 
the Convention, the Member States and the EU are not entitled to exercise their vot-
ing rights under the Convention concurrently. Accordingly, either the Member 
State(s) supporting the proposal or the Union opposing the addition of PFOS will be 
deprived of their right to vote. Even though the Union has the possibility to submit 
a declaration of non-acceptance of an amendment proposed and voted for by several 
Member States, the precise implications of such an action are unclear and could 
give rise to legal uncertainty, not only within the EU but also for non-member coun-
tries that are a party to the Convention. Under those circumstances, the Court of 
Justice concluded that Sweden’s unilateral initiative compromised the principle of 
unity in the international representation of the Union and its Member States.25
The Court’s judgment reveals that Member States are subject to special duties of 
action and abstention as soon as a “concerted common strategy” has been developed 
at the level of the EU. The form of this strategy is irrelevant and there is no require-
ment to adopt a legally binding document. In this respect, the Court has extended its 
previous case law, where it already held that the adoption of a decision authorising 
the Commission to negotiate a multilateral (mixed) agreement on behalf of the 
Community (now Union) marks the start of a concerted EU action at the interna-
tional level,26 to situations where the Council has not adopted a formal decision. As 
soon as a matter is discussed within the EU institutions, the Member States are 
obliged to refrain from acting individually.
The duty of cooperation implies that Member States’ actions at the international 
level may not affect the EU’s decision-making process. By unilaterally proposing an 
amendment to Annex A of the Stockholm Convention only one week after the 
Council working group meeting had decided to postpone the adoption of an EU 
position on the subject, Sweden bypassed the internal decision-making process. The 
question is, of course, in such situations how long Member States must refrain from 
acting individually? Whereas a one week interval between a Council meeting and 
the unilateral action is obviously unreasonable, Advocate General Maduro hinted 
that “Member States must not be caught in a never-ending process, in which a final 
decision by the [Union] is postponed to the point of inaction. If that proves to be the 
case, a decision should be deemed to have been taken and Member States should be 
allowed to act.”27 Whereas the starting point of the duty of cooperation is clearly 
25 Judgment of 20 April 2010, Commission v Sweden, C-246/07, EU:C:2010:203, paragraph 104.
26 Judgment of 2 June 2005, Commission v Luxembourg, C-266/03, EU:C:2005:341, paragraph 60; 
Judgment of 14 July 2005, Commission v Germany, C-433/03, EU:C:2005:462, paragraph 66.
27 AG Poiares Maduro Opinion of 20 April 2010, Commission v Sweden, C-246/07, EU:C:2009:589, 
paragraph 57.
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established, i.e., the existence of a “concerted common strategy”, the point where 
the Member States are allowed to act unilaterally in the absence of a final EU deci-
sion remains undefined.
Hence, despite the conceptual differences between the application of the duty of 
cooperation in areas of shared or exclusive competence, a comparison of the IMO 
and PFOS cases seems to indicate that the practical effects may be the same. 
Unilateral external action by the Member States is precluded in order to preserve the 
unity of the EU’s external representation in both cases. The question is, of course, 
how such a far-reaching interpretation can be reconciled with the fundamental con-
stitutional principle of conferral (Article 5 TEU). In this respect, it is noteworthy to 
recall the Court’s conclusions in Opinion 1/94. In response to the Commission’s 
argument that the joint participation of both the Community and the Member States 
in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) would risk to undermine the unity of action 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world and weaken its negotiating power, the Court unequivo-
cally stated that, even though legitimate, such concerns cannot modify the division 
of competences.28 In other words, rather than being a competence conferring rule, 
the principle of loyalty entails a number of practical legal obligations to ensure the 
effet utile of the EU’s (external) action.
Accordingly, the decisive criterion to decide on the concrete implications of the 
loyalty principle for the scope of autonomous Member States action is not so much 
the nature of the EU competence at stake,29 but rather the impact of Member State 
action on the consistency and coherence of the EU’s external action (De Baere 
2011, p. 417). Reflecting the wording of Article 4(3) TEU, the Member States can-
not adopt individual positions in international organisations when this would impede 
or hinder the attainment of the Union’s tasks and objectives. Such a harmful effect 
is presumed as soon as the Member States act in an area covered by common EU 
rules. This follows from the AETR-rule as confirmed in the IMO case. When no 
common EU rules exist, such as in the PFOS case, independent Member State 
action is only excluded under two conditions. First, there has to be a “concerted 
Union strategy”. Significantly, Member States always have a duty to inform the 
Union institutions so that a Union strategy can be adopted. Moreover, the postpone-
ment of international action can qualify as a Union strategy. Second, individual 
Member State action is excluded when it is liable to have negative consequences for 
the Union. This was obviously the case in Commission v Sweden, taking into account 
the possible adoption of a rule of international law that would be binding on the 
Union. This also explains why the Court could not accept the argument that Article 
193 TFEU (ex Article 176 TEC) allows the Member States to take more stringent 
28 Opinion of 15 November 1994, WTO, 1/94, EU:C:1994:384, paragraphs 106–107.
29 In this respect, it is noteworthy that “the duty of genuine cooperation is of general application and 
does not depend either on whether the Union competence concerned is exclusive or on any right of 
the Member States to enter into obligations towards non-member countries”. See Judgment of 20 
April 2010, Commission v Sweden, C-246/07, EU:C:2010:203, paragraph 71; Judgment of 2 June 
2005, Commission v Luxembourg, C-266/03, EU:C:2005:341, paragraph 58; Judgment of 14 July 
2005, Commission v Germany, C-433/03, EU:C:2005:462, paragraph 64.
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national measures to protect the environment.30 Contrary to a national measure, 
Sweden’s action could impose an internationally binding rule upon the EU and 
would thus compromise the exercise of Union competences (Van Elsuwege 2011, 
p. 312).
Hence, the duty of loyalty can be regarded as a multifaceted legal instrument 
ensuring the unity of the EU’s international representation while respecting the 
internal division of competences. In a first step, it entails an obligation for the 
Member States to inform the EU institutions so that a concerted Union strategy can 
be contemplated. Such a duty of prior consultation has a preventive objective, i.e., 
to avoid future inconsistencies between Member State action and EU rules. For this 
reason, Member States also have to inform and consult the relevant institutions prior 
to instituting dispute-settlement proceedings.31 In a further step, when individual 
Member State action would indeed negatively affect the Union’s tasks and objec-
tives, the duty of loyalty effectively turns into an obligation of result. This de facto 
limitation of the Member States’ sovereign powers may be regarded as a natural 
consequence in a constitutional order where they accepted, as stated in Article 4(3) 
TEU, to “facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any mea-
sure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”.
From this perspective, the—at first sight—rather ambiguous conclusion of the 
Court in the Inland Waterways cases becomes more comprehensible. In those cases, 
the Court left some flexibility regarding the concrete duties for the Member States 
flowing from the principle of loyalty when it stated that32:
The adoption of a decision authorising the Commission to negotiate a multilateral agree-
ment on behalf of the Community marks the start of a concerted Community action at 
international level and requires for that purpose, if not a duty of abstention on the part of the 
Member States, at the very least a duty of close cooperation between the latter and the 
Community institutions in order to facilitate the achievement of the Community tasks and 
to ensure the coherence and consistency of the action and its international representation.
This crucial paragraph illustrates very clearly the flexible legal nature of the loy-
alty principle, which implies a “best efforts obligation”—a duty of information and 
consultation—that may turn into an obligation of result—a duty of abstention—if 
required in order to ensure the coherence and consistency of the EU’s international 
action and representation.
30 Judgment of 20 April 2010, Commission v Sweden, C-246/07, EU:C:2010:203, paragraph 102.
31 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant), C-459/03, EU:C:2006:345, para-
graph 179.
32 Judgment of 2 June 2005, Commission v Luxembourg, C-266/03, EU:C:2005:341, paragraph 60 
and Judgment of 14 July 2005, Commission v Germany, C-433/03, EU:C:2005:462, paragraph 66.
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4  The Protection of Member State Interests: Procedural 
Options
Despite the reciprocal application of the loyalty principle, it appears that the obliga-
tions imposed on the EU institutions are less imperative in comparison to the more 
straightforward duties of cooperation and abstention for the Member States (Hillion 
2009, p. 28). Notably, in Greece v Commission the Court acknowledged that the 
Commission is expected to cooperate with the Member States but only cautiously 
formulated the institution’s obligations33:
in order to fulfil its duty of genuine cooperation under Article 10 EC, the Commission could 
have endeavoured to submit that proposal to the Maritime Safety Committee and allowed a 
debate on the subject. As is apparent from Article 2(2)(b) of the Standard rules of proce-
dure, such a committee is also a forum enabling exchanges of views between the 
Commission and the Member States. The Commission, in chairing that committee, may not 
prevent such an exchange of views on the sole ground that a proposal is of a national 
nature.
This vigilant formulation raises the question whether the duty of cooperation is 
equally constraining the institutions and the Member States when they are exercis-
ing their powers. Apart from the different nature of the obligations resulting from 
the duty of loyalty, there is also a significant difference in terms of the available 
options for judicial review. The Member States are subject to the scrutiny on the part 
of the European Commission under Article 258 TFEU. In contrast, it seems more 
difficult for the Member States to bring a successful case against EU institutions for 
a failure to observe the duty of sincere cooperation. From the conclusions in the 
IMO case, where the Court excluded the adoption of compensation measures,34 it 
follows that Member States first have to bring proceedings for a failure to act to the 
Court under Article 265 TFEU.  Under those circumstances, it is questionable 
whether the political inaction of the institutions to implement a concerted strategy 
within a reasonable period would be a sufficient argument to support that action.
Of course, the Member States may protect their interests by other procedural 
means. A good example is the action for annulment, launched by Germany, against 
the Council whereby it challenged the adoption of a Council decision establishing 
the position to be adopted on behalf of the EU with regard to certain resolutions to 
be voted in the framework of the International Organisation for Vine and Wine 
(OIV). The OIV is a technical organisation which adopts non-binding recommenda-
tions on technical standards for producing and marketing wine and vine products. 
The EU itself is not a member of the OIV but 21 EU Member States are. Significantly, 
some OIV recommendations are included in the EU’s regulation establishing a 
common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO 
33 Judgment of 12 February 2009, Commission v Greece, C-45/07, EU:C:2009:81, paragraph 25 
[emphasis added].
34 Ibid. paragraph 26.
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Regulation).35 Until June 2010, the EU Member States and the Commission had co- 
ordinated their position in an informal manner prior to OIV General Assembly 
meetings. In 2010, the procedure was formalised in the sense that the Council adopts 
a common position upon a proposal of the Commission, on the basis of Article 
218(9) TFEU.  Germany challenged this practice on the grounds that this Treaty 
provision can only be used when the EU is a member of the international organisa-
tion concerned and when that organisation adopts internally legally binding acts. 
Since both elements were not fulfilled with respect to the OIV, Germany claimed the 
annulment of a Council decision establishing the position to be adopted on behalf of 
the EU in the OIV. The situation was largely similar to a more recent case, where 
Germany challenged the validity of a Council decision establishing the EU’s posi-
tion in the review committee of the International Organisation for International 
Carriage by Rail (OTIF)—of which the EU alongside 26 Member States is a 
 member—on the ground that the EU lacked the necessary external competence in 
the absence of internal EU rules that could be affected by the international action.36 
In addition, the German government argued that, by virtue of the principle of sin-
cere cooperation, the EU institutions should organise the procedure for the adoption 
of the EU’s position in such a way that the Member States have sufficient time to 
seek clarification on the competence question before the Court of Justice.37
Arguably, Germany’s actions may be regarded as an attempt to counter the far- 
reaching implications of the Court’s case law on the duty of since cooperation. This 
case law has so far essentially focused on the Member States’ duties of action and 
abstention (cf. supra), whereas this time the question concerned the EU’s scope of 
action and the procedural obligations of the EU institutions under the loyalty prin-
ciple. However, as opposed to the German expectations, the Court of Justice used 
the opportunity to further strengthen the EU’s external role. In the OTIF case, it 
clarified that the existence of internal EU rules is not a prerequisite for external EU 
action in areas of shared competence. The EU can act at the international level as 
soon as there is a link with the realisation of the Treaty objectives in a particular 
policy area, the common transport policy in this particular case.38 Moreover, the 
Court failed to find a violation of the principle of sincere cooperation because the 
Republic of Germany was able to bring an action of annulment of the contested 
decision before the Court, and a request for the suspension of its implementation, 
before the effects of that decision became irreversible in the framework of the inter-
national organisation.39 In the OIV case, the Court found that the Council can adopt 
positions “on the Union’s behalf” in a body set up by an international agreement, 
even when the EU is not a party to the agreement establishing the international body 
35 Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 
establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products, [2013] OJ L 347/671.
36 Judgment of 5 December 2017, Germany v Council (OTIF), C-600/14, EU:C:2017:935, para-
graph 43.
37 Ibid. paragraph 95.
38 Ibid. paragraph 58.
39 Ibid. paragraph 108.
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in question. The only criterion is that the adopted position must concern an area of 
law which falls within the EU’s competence.40 It further pointed out that the OIV 
recommendations, despite their non-binding nature, are “acts having legal effects” 
by virtue of their incorporation in the Single CMO Regulation. Hence, the direct 
link between the activities at the international level—in this case the OIV—and the 
development of the EU acquis—in this case the Single CMO Regulation—curtails 
the scope for individual Member State action. Whereas this logic is consistent with 
the Court’s case law on the duty of sincere cooperation, its far-reaching—and to a 
certain extent paradoxical—implications cannot be underestimated. It basically 
rules out the scope of individual action for the EU Member States that are members 
of the OIV.  Their role is reduced to act as defenders of the EU’s joint position, 
which, controversially, is partly determined by EU Member States that are non-OIV 
members. From the perspective of public international law, they, however, remain 
responsible, in their own name, for contracting the rights and obligations in the 
organisation concerned (Govaere 2015, p. 239). The rulings also have implications 
for the functioning of the international organisations themselves. When EU Member 
States are prevented from expressing their position, unless there is a formally 
adopted EU common position adopted prior to the debates, this may undermine the 
influence of the Union, or even lead to situations where the international organisa-
tion is held hostage as a result of internal EU struggles (Govaere 2015, p.  240; 
Tournaye 2014). This is particularly relevant in the case of organisations, such as the 
OIV, where 21 out of the 46 members are EU Member States.
5  Conclusions
It follows from the Court’s established case law that the rather abstract duty of coop-
eration implies concrete substantive and procedural obligations for the Member 
States. Arguably, the duties imposed are more imperative when the Member States’ 
action within the institutional and procedural framework of an international organ-
isation (or agreement) has direct consequences for the Union41 and when the areas 
of competence of the Union and the Member States are closely interrelated.42 The 
underlying motivation is obviously to protect the unity of the EU’s international 
representation, which is in itself instrumental to achieve the objectives of the EU’s 
external action as expressed in Article 21 TEU. In other words, the rationale of the 
loyalty obligations under the Treaties is essentially to protect the interests of the 
Union, rather than the interests of the individual Member States. This implies that 
40 Judgment of 7 October 2014, Germany v Council (OIV), C-399/12, EU:C:2014:2258, paragraph 
52.
41 The impossibility for the Union to exercise its voting rights under the Stockholm Convention if 
any of the Member States exercises its right to vote is a clear example of such a situation.
42 See Judgment of 30 May 2006, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant), C-459/03, EU:C:2006:345, 
paragraph 176.
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Member States may regard the principle of sincere cooperation as a mechanism of 
competence creep, which is gradually reducing their possibilities to act in the inter-
national arena.
Following the AETR logic, any international action with (potential) implications 
for the EU’s internal legislation requires the involvement of the EU’s institutions. 
This, of course, has far-reaching implications for the scope of autonomous Member 
State action. As observed by Delgado Casteleiro and Larik, “the duty of since co- 
operation in external relations manifests itself indeed rather often as a duty for the 
Member States to keep silent, unless told to speak by the EU institutions” (Delgado 
Casteleiro and Larik 2011, p. 540). Whereas the underlying motivations, i.e., ensur-
ing the unity of the EU’s international representation and the uniform application of 
EU legislation, are quite understandable, the consequences may be rather paradoxi-
cal. Without a clear EU mandate, Member States are severely restricted in their 
possibilities to intervene internationally, whereas they remain responsible under 
public international law. Moreover, the decision-making at the international level 
may be paralysed as a result of the EU’s inaction. Hence, close cooperation between 
the Member States and the EU institutions is not only of paramount importance for 
safeguarding the EU’s position at the international level but equally for protecting 
legitimate Member State interests.
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